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Abstract 
The debate over a new farm bill has focused on how to spend an additional $73.5 
billion in funding for the agricultural budget over 10 years. The House of Representa-
tives, the Senate agriculture committee, and Senators Cochran and Roberts (supported by 
the Bush administration) have each proposed a structure for the next farm bill. A critical 
question becomes whether these proposals conflict with U.S. commitments to limit 
subsidies under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. This paper explores 
this issue and concludes with a discussion of the future direction of U.S. farm subsidies 
and new WTO agreements. 
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U.S. FARM POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION: HOW DO THEY MATCH UP? 
Introduction 
The debate over a new farm bill began in earnest last year with hearings in both the 
Senate and House agriculture committees. The stakes of the debate were raised when 
Congress set aside an additional $73.5 billion in funding for the agricultural budget over 
10 years. The House passed its version of the farm bill (H.R. 2646) in the fall. The Senate 
agriculture committee passed a farm bill (S. 1731), but the full Senate has not yet agreed 
on the direction it wants to take farm policy, other than that it wants to spend the full 
$73.5 billion. Farm lobbyists and farm-state legislators have convinced the Bush 
administration of the need to spend the additional $73.5 billion. The administration has 
come out in support of a farm bill proposal created by Senators Cochran and Roberts—a 
plan that was rejected by the Senate in December.  
With each new farm bill, the array of federal agricultural programs is modified. New 
programs are added while some existing programs are changed or eliminated. Individual 
programs are designed to address a given issue in agriculture. The federal crop insurance 
program provides producers with subsidized insurance for their crop yields and/or 
revenues. Marketing loan programs guarantee farmers a minimum price for their 
products. The Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments provide income support to 
the agricultural sector.  
The emergency agricultural support packages of the last four years have led many to 
conclude that the current farm program does not provide adequate support to farmers and 
that federal agricultural expenditures are too low. Thus, many are looking to change the 
existing policy. The proposed changes range from modifications of existing programs to 
creation of new ones.  
Much of the discussion so far has focused on the countercyclical nature (or lack 
thereof) of farm programs. Within the current programs, the marketing loan and crop 
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insurance programs are countercyclical because expenditures increase in response to a 
decline in either price or yield. Marketing loan payments increase with lower prices. Crop 
insurance indemnities accrue when yield and/or revenue fall below set levels. PFC 
payments are not countercyclical because they are fixed throughout the life of the program. 
 While the outcome of the farm bill debate is in doubt, there seems to be no doubt that 
additional subsidies will be given to agriculture over the next 10 years. A critical question 
becomes whether these subsidies conflict with our commitments to limit subsidies under 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. We will explore this issue in detail by 
first summarizing the three leading proposals. Each builds on the existing structure of the 
current farm bill while adding additional programs to provide support to agricultural 
producers. We will present the terms of the U.S. commitments to the WTO. We will then 
estimate compliance of the three proposals with WTO rules and discuss the likelihood that 
farm subsidies could exceed our commitments. We will conclude with comments about the 
future direction of U.S. farm subsidies and new WTO agreements.  
 
Alternative Farm Bill Proposals  
 The House farm bill continues fixed decoupled payments (like the PFC payments), 
maintains the marketing loan program, elevates soybeans and minor oilseeds to program 
crop status, and creates a new countercyclical program. The fixed decoupled payments 
are based on a combination of payment yields, acreage, and payment rates. The payment 
yields for the new payments are the same as those used in the current PFC payments, 
with the exception of soybeans, which uses yields based on average yields over the 1981–
1985 period (the same period over which the other program crops established their 
program yields). The payment acreage is set at either the farm’s current payment acreage 
for PFC payments or the 1998–2001 average planted acreage for all program crops on the 
farm. The House farm bill also follows the PFC program convention of payment on only 
85 percent of eligible acres. The payment rates are set slightly higher than PFC payment 
rates for 2002 and are locked in for the entire life of the bill. For the marketing loan 
program, the major changes are in the loan rate settings. The soybean loan rate is lowered 
to $4.92 per bushel, the barley loan rate is capped at $1.65 per bushel, the oat loan rate 
has a maximum level of $1.21 per bushel, and the sorghum loan rate is raised to $1.89 per 
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bushel. Soybeans and minor oilseeds would be eligible for both the fixed decoupled and 
countercyclical payments under the bill. However, producers must choose to update 
program acreage to enroll soybean and minor oilseed acreage. The countercyclical 
program pays producers when prices fall below a set level. Target prices are established 
for each of the program crops. Under the House bill, the effective market price is 
calculated as the sum of the maximum of the crop’s loan rate or 12-month national 
average farm price and the payment rate for the fixed decoupled payments (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2001). When the effective market price is less than the target price, 
producers receive a payment with the rate equal to the difference between the target price 
and the effective market price. The payment yields and acreage from the fixed decoupled 
payments are also used in the countercyclical program. Thus, the House countercyclical 
program uses a fixed payment base but a variable payment rate that is responsive to 
current prices. The variable payment rate is maximized when the 12-month national 
average farm price is below the loan rate. The House farm bill covers the 2002–2011 crop 
years. 
 The Senate agriculture committee farm bill follows the basic structure of the House 
farm bill (U.S. Senate 2001). It continues fixed decoupled payments, maintains the 
marketing loan program, elevates soybeans and minor oilseeds to program crop status, 
and creates a new countercyclical program. It is in the details of the two programs where 
the differences arise. In the Senate version, the fixed decoupled payments have different 
payment rates and allow for updating on both payment acreage and yield. Payment 
acreage may be based on either current PFC acreage or 1998–2001 average planted 
acreage. Payment yield may be based on either current PFC yields or 1998–2001 average 
yields (after some adjustments). The payments are based on 100 percent of eligible 
production, as opposed to 85 percent for both current law and the House farm bill. Also, 
soybean and minor oilseed acreage can be enrolled in the program without updating 
payment acreage on other crops. The fixed payment rates are set near the 2002 PFC rates 
in the beginning. In 2004, the fixed payment rates are reduced by 50 percent. The 
exception to this is for sorghum where the fixed payment rate is set at $0.31 per bushel in 
2002 and $0.135 per bushel in 2004. Another 50 percent reduction in rates is scheduled 
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for 2006. Marketing loan rates are raised for all eligible crops except soybeans where the 
loan rate is lowered to $5.20 per bushel.  
 The countercyclical program has a structure quite similar to the House proposal. It 
pays producers when prices fall below a set level. Income protection prices are 
established for each of the program crops. Under the Senate agriculture committee bill, 
the effective market price is calculated as the sum of the maximum of the crop’s loan rate 
or five-month national average farm price (the first five months of the marketing year) 
and the payment rate for the fixed decoupled payments. When the effective market price 
is less than the income protection price, producers receive a payment with the rate equal 
to the difference between the income protection price and the effective market price. The 
payment yields and acreage from the fixed decoupled payments are also used in the 
countercyclical program. Thus, the Senate agriculture committee countercyclical program 
uses a fixed payment base but a variable payment rate that is responsive to current prices. 
The variable payment rate is maximized when the five-month national average farm price 
is below the loan rate. Also, given the initial settings of the loan rates, income protection 
prices, and fixed decoupled payment rates, the countercyclical program under the Senate 
agriculture committee proposal cannot make any payments until 2004. The Senate 
agriculture committee farm bill covers the 2002–2006 crop years. 
 The Cochran-Roberts farm bill also continues fixed decoupled payments, maintains 
the marketing loan program, elevates soybeans and minor oilseeds to program crop 
status, and creates a new countercyclical program. The payment acreage for the fixed 
decoupled payments is established at either the current PFC base for the farm, the current 
PFC base for the farm plus 1998-2001 average planted acreage to soybeans and minor 
oilseeds, or the 1998–2001 average planted acreage to all program crops. Payment yields 
are set at the current PFC payment yields, except for soybeans and minor oilseeds, which 
are paid on yields calculated by the product of the farm’s 1998–2001 average oilseed 
yield and the ratio of national average oilseed yields for 1981–1985 and 1998–2001. 
Payment rates are significantly higher than the 2002 PFC payment rates. And as with the 
House fixed decoupled payments and PFC payments, only 85 percent of eligible 
production receives a payment. The marketing loan provisions follow those in the House 
bill. The new countercyclical program is a farm savings account program. The program is 
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structured to compensate for declines in gross revenue. Adjusted gross revenue is 
calculated as the sum of gross receipts from all agricultural enterprises (except tobacco), 
insurance indemnities, and government payments, less the costs of items purchased for 
resale (such as feeder cattle). Targets are established at the five-year average of adjusted 
gross revenue. For producers to qualify for the farm savings account program, they must 
have a five-year average adjusted gross revenue of at least $20,000 (with exceptions for 
limited resource and beginning producers). The accounts are funded by producer 
contributions and government matching funds. The accounts have a maximum limit of 
150 percent of the five-year average adjusted gross revenue on the farm, and the 
government matching funds are limited to a maximum of $10,000 per account per year. 
Total matching funds are limited to $800 million in 2002. This limit increases by $100 
million each year until 2006. The accounts are allowed to earn interest at commercial 
rates. Producers can withdraw money from the accounts either when realized adjusted 
gross revenue is less than 90 percent of the their five-year average adjusted gross revenue 
or when the producer retires. The Cochran-Roberts bill covers the 2002-2006 crop years. 
To provide a quick summary of the main differences among the proposals, we list the 
various program loan rates, fixed payment rates, and target/income protection prices in 
Tables 1-3. Where applicable, we also have included figures from the current farm bill. 
All of these programs would fall under the provisions of the WTO. The United States is a 
member of the WTO and has committed to limiting the kind of industry support that 
affects the trade of goods and services. The WTO is the successor organization of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT was established after 
World War II, along with agreements to form other international organizations, such as 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  
GATT provided rules on employment, restrictive government and business practices, 
investment, and world trade affairs. The Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade 
Negotiations replaced the GATT institutional framework with an official organization 
(the WTO) to oversee international trade issues. 
There are sector-level trade agreements within the WTO. Agriculture is one of the 
sectors with such an agreement (often referred to as URAA for Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture) (WTO 1994). Under the URAA, countries agreed to reduce agricultural  
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TABLE 1. Marketing loan rates ($/yield unit) 
Crop 2001 Actual House 
Senate Ag. 
Comm. 
Cochran-
Roberts 
Barley 1.65 1.65 2.00 1.65 
Corn 1.89 1.89 2.08 1.89 
Cotton 0.5192 0.5192 0.5500 0.5192 
Oats 1.21 1.21 1.50 1.21 
Rice 6.50 6.50 6.85 6.50 
Sorghum 1.71 1.89 2.08 1.89 
Soybeans 5.26 4.92 5.20 4.92 
Wheat 2.58 2.58 3.00 2.58 
 
TABLE 2. Fixed payment rates ($/yield unit) 
   Cochran- Senate Ag. Comm. 
Crop 2002 PFC House Roberts 2002-03 2004-05 2006 
Barley 0.20 0.25 0.3440 0.20 0.10 0.05 
Corn 0.26 0.30 0.4128 0.27 0.135 0.068 
Cotton 0.0556 0.0667 0.1418 0.13 0.065 0.0325 
Oats 0.021 0.025 0.0344 0.05 0.025 0.013 
Rice 2.04 2.35 3.23 2.45 1.225 0.6125 
Sorghum 0.31 0.36 0.4953 0.31 0.135 0.068 
Soybeans 0.00 0.42 0.5779 0.55 0.275 0.138 
Wheat 0.46 0.53 0.7292 0.45 0.225 0.113 
 
TABLE 3. Target or income protection prices ($/yield unit) 
Crop House Senate Ag. Comm. 
Barley 2.39 2.20 
Corn 2.78 2.35 
Cotton 0.7360 0.6800 
Oats 1.47 1.55 
Rice 10.82 9.30 
Sorghum 2.64 2.35 
Soybeans 5.86 5.75 
Wheat 4.04 3.45 
 
protection and support by opening domestic markets to import competition and by reducing 
domestic support and export subsidies. The market access provisions prohibit new non-
tariff import barriers, convert existing non-tariff barriers into tariffs, and specify a reduction 
in tariff levels. The export subsidy provisions prohibit new export subsidies and reduce 
both the level of export subsidies and the quantities exported under them. The domestic 
support provisions target reductions in trade-distorting domestic government policies.  
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Many cite the WTO commitments made by the United States as being an important 
constraint on the design of future U.S. farm programs. Indeed, much of the debate on the 
three proposals has centered on the “WTO compliance” of each. But many are confused 
about the U.S. commitments and their future importance. The objective of this paper is to 
fill this gap in understanding by providing a detailed explanation of the WTO agreement 
and estimates of whether the United States has fully complied with its WTO 
commitments in recent years. In addition, we project the degree of compliance through 
the 2002 marketing year. After this projection, we examine how each of three proposed 
farm bills would affect U.S. compliance.  
We find that the United States has met its WTO obligations in recent years. 
Furthermore, given no changes in the current policy mix, we project that the U.S. will 
continue to meets its commitments. However, some new policy proposals could 
jeopardize WTO compliance, particularly if WTO members adopt the recent U.S. 
proposal for more strict limits on agricultural support. The Proposal for Comprehensive 
Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform, submitted to the WTO by the United States, 
outlines additional reductions in trade-distorting practices above existing guidelines 
(Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2000). 
 
Domestic Support Commitments within the World Trade Organization 
In the URAA, domestic support programs and policies are classified by their trade-
distorting effects and their exemption status. The classifications are often described in 
terms of colored boxes:  “green” for the least trade-distorting programs, “amber” for 
more trade-distorting programs, and “blue” for specific programs outlined in the 
agreement. Green and blue box programs are exempt from WTO commitments. Amber 
box programs may be exempt or may be limited under WTO commitments. Therefore, 
the analogy of a traffic stoplight adequately describes the range of domestic support 
programs under the URAA. Countries can continue (“Go”) all green and blue box 
programs at any level of funding. Countries may continue to use amber box policies as 
long as the expenditures on them do not exceed set levels (“Proceed with caution”).  
The amber box expenditure limit is based on the country’s agricultural support over a 
base period. For the United States, the base period covers the years 1986–1988. The 
8 / Hart and Babcock 
value of domestic support in the amber box is called the aggregate measure of support 
(AMS). The countries that signed the URAA agreed to limit amber box spending to a 
level at or below their AMS from their base period. Developed countries and 
confederations, such as the United States and the European Union, agreed to 20 percent 
reductions in their AMS limits by 1999. The United States’ base period AMS is $23.9 
billion. The current U.S. AMS limit is $19.1 billion. Within the amber box, programs can 
be exempted from the limits if their AMS amounts are considered too small to count. 
These exemptions are referred to as de minimis exemptions. 
The rules governing the placement of a domestic support program in the boxes are 
specific. Blue box policies are production-limiting policies that base payments on fixed 
yields and acreage. Payments must be limited to 85 percent of the base level of 
production. The old U.S. target price-deficiency payment program that existed before 
1996 was a blue box program. Green box policies are policies that have minimal trade 
impacts. Payments from green box policies cannot be linked to current production and/or 
prices. The URAA lists several types of green box policies and the guidelines that they 
must follow. The following program types can qualify for the green box: 
 1. general services 
 2. public stockholding for food security purposes 
 3. domestic food aid 
 4. direct payments to producers 
 5. decoupled income support 
 6. government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net 
programs 
 7. payments for relief from natural disasters 
 8. structural adjustment assistance provided through producer or resource 
retirement programs 
 9. structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids 
 10. payments under environmental programs 
 11. payments under regional assistance programs 
Each of these program types has guidelines that define the eligibility of the program for 
the green box. Any direct payments to producers provided by means of a government 
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program cannot involve transfers from consumers (only taxpayers). Thus, green box 
programs cannot support prices. The guidelines for decoupled income support are as follows: 
 1. Eligibility for the program must be based on clearly defined criteria over a 
fixed base period. 
 2. Payment amounts cannot be related to production, prices or input usage after 
the base period. 
 3. No production can be required to receive payments. 
For government-provided income insurance or safety net programs to be green box, 
the requirements are as follows: 
 1. Income and income loss can only be from agricultural sources. 
 2. Loss must exceed 30 percent of average gross income (or an equivalent 
amount of net income) where average income is determined by a three-year 
average income (from the previous three years) or a five-year “olympic” aver-
age income (removing the high and low years before averaging). 
 3. If payments are provided by this program and a natural disaster relief program, the 
total amount of payments cannot exceed 100 percent of the producer’s total loss. 
The requirements for natural disaster relief are as follows: 
 1. Eligibility is determined by a formal disaster announcement from the 
government with at least a 30 percent production loss based on average pro-
duction (the previous three-year average or the five-year “olympic” average). 
 2. Payments may be made only on losses due to the disaster. 
 3. Payments cannot be for more than the amount of loss and requirements on 
future production. 
 4. If payments are provided by this program and a natural disaster relief program, the 
total amount of payments cannot exceed 100 percent of the producer’s total loss. 
Producer retirement programs qualify for exemption if eligibility for the program is 
clearly defined on criteria to transition the producer out of agricultural production, and 
the payments are conditional on complete retirement from agricultural production. 
Resource retirement programs qualify under the following stipulations: 
 1. Payments are conditional on the resource staying out of agricultural production 
for at least three years. 
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 2. Requirements cannot be placed on alternative use of the resource or other 
resources employed in agricultural production. 
 3. Payments cannot be related to any remaining agricultural production in which 
the producer is involved. 
Environmental program payments qualify for the green box exemption if eligibility 
requirements are clearly defined and dependent on specific conditions, possibly involving 
production inputs or practices, and if the payment is limited to the extra cost or income 
loss the producer faces to be in compliance. Programs that fit these general types, but fail 
to meet the exemption conditions, and all other domestic support programs would fall 
into the amber box and would possibly be limited under the URAA. 
Amber box policies still can be exempted from the AMS counted against a country’s 
limit if the policy is termed de minimis. For developed countries, a 5 percent rule is used. 
For commodity-specific support, a policy can be declared de minimis if the expenditures 
under the policy are less than 5 percent of the value of production for the commodity. For 
non-commodity-specific support, all such policies can be declared de minimis if total 
expenditures under all of the policies are less than 5 percent of the total value of 
agricultural production in the country. 
 
The World Trade Organization and the Current Farm Bill 
The WTO agreements have had and will continue to have effects on U.S. farm 
policy. The 1996 farm bill and any future farm bills fall under the requirement of the 
URAA and any successor agreements. To see how current U.S. farm programs fare under 
the URAA, we examine the classification of U.S. farm programs and why the programs 
are classified as they are. Countries typically submit reports on overall domestic support 
two to three years after the fact. The United States has submitted reports for the 1995-
1998 marketing years. For current policies that were in place at that time, we can place 
them in the WTO boxes based on these submissions. For current policies created after 
1998, we will place the policies based on our interpretation of the URAA. Other 
interpretations are possible. 
Current green box domestic support comes from several of the program types discussed 
in the previous section. General services programs include the Agricultural Research Service; 
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the Tennessee Valley Authority; the Cooperative State Research, Extension, and Education 
Service; the Rural Business and Cooperative Development Service; the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service; the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyard Administration; the 
Food Safety Inspection Service; the Agricultural Marketing Service; the Economic Research 
Service; the National Agricultural Statistics Service; and the National Resources 
Conservation Service. These programs combined for roughly $7 billion in domestic support 
annually. Domestic food aid accounted for over $30 billion annually, with most of this total 
being in the food stamp and child nutrition programs. 
PFC payments also are green box as they are classified as decoupled income support. 
The construction of the PFC program follows the guidelines of a decoupled income support 
program that qualifies for exemption. Payment eligibility and amounts are based on historical 
production over a base period. Current production decisions (even the decision not to produce 
at all) cannot affect the payment. Given that there is no link between current production and 
PFC payments, these payments should have a very limited to nonexistent effect on future 
production and therefore are not considered trade distorting. 
Green box natural disaster relief programs include the Non-insured Crop Disaster 
Assistance Program, the Livestock Indemnity Program, and emergency feed and forage 
programs. The Conservation Reserve Program qualifies as a resource retirement program. 
Programs that facilitate structural adjustment through investment aids include the Farm 
Credit Program and State Mediation Grants. Environmental programs that qualify for 
exemption include the Agricultural and Emergency Conservation Programs, the Great 
Plains Conservation Program, the Water Bank Program, the Wetland Reserve Program, 
and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program. 
The United States has increased its green box spending by a large amount over the past 
several years. Over the period 1986–1988, programs that would have qualified for the 
green box had total expenditures of, on average, just over $26 billion. From 1996 to 1998, 
green box spending had increased to an average of $50 billion. Because the green box 
spending is exempt from WTO limits, the United States can continue to add to this total. 
It is in amber box spending that the United States could run afoul of the WTO and 
the URAA. Amber box spending is limited under the URAA, and the United States, as a 
developed country, has agreed to reduce such spending by 20 percent from its 1986–1988 
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average. This implies that the United States can spend up to $19.1 billion on amber box 
programs. Figure 1 shows the AMS limits, actual AMS amounts for 1996–1998, and our 
projections for AMS amounts for 1999 to 2002 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2001). Our projections are based on U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) figures on various program expenditures for 1998–2001, where possible, and 
USDA and Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) projections for 2002 
figures or when actual data could not be obtained.  
AMS is separated into commodity-specific and non-commodity-specific categories 
for the calculation of de minimis exemptions. For 1996–1998, the United States reported 
the following program payments or costs as commodity-specific domestic support:  the 
dairy, sugar, and peanut price support/quota programs; marketing loan gains; loan 
deficiency payments; commodity loan forfeiture costs; cotton user marketing payments; 
dairy indemnities; mohair and wool support payments; rice marketing certificate 
payments; tobacco price-related payments; commodity storage payments; and commodity 
loan interest subsidies. Over the same time, the United States reported these non-
commodity-specific domestic support payments: estimated water subsidies from several 
Bureau of Reclamation projects, net federal outlays for livestock grazing on federal land, 
net crop insurance indemnities (insurance payments less producer-paid premiums) for  
 
Note: Actual numbers are reported for 1996-98. Projections are made for 1999 and beyond. 
FIGURE 1. Total amber box spending, payment caps, and de minimis exclusions 
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both yield and revenue insurance policies, multi-year crop disaster payments, market loss 
assistance (MLA) payments, and state credit programs.  
Marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, commodity storage payments, and 
commodity loan interest subsidies arise from the marketing loan programs. The price 
support and marketing loan program expenditures are classified as amber box because 
payments depend on current production and prices. Given this link, the programs can 
influence future production decisions and have trade-distorting effects. Net crop 
insurance indemnities are also in the amber box because they do not meet the green box 
requirements. The yield and revenue insurance policies are not income insurance policies: 
coverage above 70 percent is allowed, and the government does not have to declare a 
disaster for payments to begin. Thus, these policies cannot qualify as green box either as 
an income safety net program or as a natural disaster relief program. 
Over the last four years, the federal government has augmented agricultural spending 
with emergency assistance packages. These packages included MLA and crop loss 
assistance payments for several commodities. The crop loss assistance payments were 
constructed to follow the guidelines for a natural disaster relief program and are exempt 
from WTO limits (i.e., they are green box with the exception of the multi-year program). 
The MLA payments follow the same payment formula as the PFC payments (which are 
green box), but the justification for the MLA payments was the low market prices we 
have seen over the last few years. Therefore, the MLA payments were placed in the 
amber box because the payments were triggered by (then) current market prices. The 
payment structure of the MLA programs is not commodity specific because current 
production has no impact on the payments. 
Table 4 displays the actual and projected values of production used in this analysis. 
The overall value of agricultural production has fallen since 1996. By 1999, the value of 
agricultural production had dropped to $183 billion, nearly $23 billion less than the 1996 
value. The projections indicate that production values have increased and will continue to 
do so. By 2002, agricultural production will be valued at $197 billion. These production 
values affect the U.S. WTO standing as they are used to evaluate U.S. domestic support 
versus the AMS limit. The de minimis exemptions are determined by comparing domestic 
support against 5 percent of the production value. 
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TABLE 4. Value of production 
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ($ million) 
Barley 1,091 862 687 597 632 557 760 
Beef and veal 22,259 24,893 24,153 26,051 28,388 30,453 30,732 
Corn 25,312 22,352 18,922 17,104 18,621 19,489 20,895 
Cottonseed 915 835 687 559 677 703 676 
Cotton 6,408 5,976 4,120 3,810 4,781 5,338 4,872 
Dairy 23,057 21,191 24,332 23,400 20,786 21,351 20,551 
Hogs/pork 12,013 12,552 8,674 7,766 10,791 9,403 8,233 
Honey 180 148 147 126 132 163 163 
Canola 62 88 160 107 135 129 134 
Flaxseed 10 14 34 30 35 36 37 
Mustard 2 9 11 5 4 4 4 
Rapeseed 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Safflower 76 60 58 55 30 24 25 
Sunflower 418 427 537 340 241 227 234 
Mohair 15 15 13 10 11 7 7 
Oats 319 273 200 170 165 131 156 
Peanuts 1,030 1,003 1,126 972 838 1,132 1,028 
Rice 1,687 1,756 1,687 1,230 1,073 1,340 1,339 
Rye 33 30 30 25 21 19 22 
Sorghum 2,004 1,409 905 937 823 947 1,060 
Soybeans 17,455 17,373 13,494 12,205 13,073 13,094 13,543 
Sugar 2,044 2,050 2,126 2,145 2,179 2,204 2,120 
Tobacco 2,852 3,217 2,701 2,356 1,955 1,892 1,920 
Wheat 9,815 8,287 6,781 5,594 5,970 5,638 6,609 
Wool 40 45 29 18 15 15 15 
Potatoes 2,423 2,623 2,635 2,746 2,591 2,604 2,604 
Apples 1,641 1,575 1,316 1,553 1,554 1,306 1,306 
Cranberries 308 350 199 112 107 184 184 
Lamb 435 490 354 349 357 357 357 
All other  
commodities 71,793 73,981 74,767 72,706 73,914 76,628 78,102 
        
Total 205,701 203,884 190,886 183,079 189,903 195,374 197,690 
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Table 5 shows all of the amber box expenditures before the de minimis exemptions 
are taken. These figures represent all possible expenditures that could count against the 
WTO limits. In 1996 and 1997, over $7 billion was spent on amber box programs. As 
prices deteriorated, marketing loan expenditures (loan deficiency payments, marketing 
loan gains, and commodity loan interest subsidies) grew. MLA payments were also 
appropriated. Thus, in 1998, amber box spending rose to $15 billion. In 1999 and 2000, 
spending rose to over $22 billion. Total amber box outlays are expected to fall to under 
$20 billion in 2001. By 2002, changes in the dairy programs are scheduled to take effect 
and reinforce the decline in spending. Outlays are projected to fall to $10 billion in 2002.  
Table 6 shows the expenditures that count against the U.S. AMS limit. The 
de minimis exemptions offset a sizable portion of the increase in amber box spending. In 
1996 and 1997, the U.S. AMS is roughly $6 billion, with most of this support going to 
dairy producers. Only three products receive enough support in 1996 to exceed the de 
minimis exemption level. By 1999, 18 products have support exceeding the de minimis 
exemption level and the AMS has risen to over $16 billion. This amounts to 81 percent of 
the U.S. AMS limit. For 2002, because prices are projected to rise, so, too, will 
production values and de minimis exemption limits. This means that more spending could 
qualify for exemption. But increasing prices imply smaller marketing loan outlays and 
reduced amber box spending. By 2002, the U.S. AMS falls to nearly $7 billion. 
 
The World Trade Organization and the Proposed Programs 
We have estimated 2002 marketing-year expenditures under each of the three main 
farm bill proposals to see where they fit within the URAA and their impact on the U.S. 
AMS. For the Senate agricultural committee proposal, we have looked at two scenarios, 
the policy structures in 2002 and 2004, because the proposal makes explicit changes in 
how producer payments are delivered. Table 7 shows the levels of fixed payments and 
amber box spending (both before and after de minimis) for the current farm bill and the 
various proposals. 
All of the proposals keep the existing marketing loan, crop insurance, and fixed 
decoupled payment programs in place. Also, all of the proposals reinstate the dairy price 
support program. This implies that any additional expenditures from these proposals add to  
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TABLE 5. Aggregate measures of support (before de minimis exemptions) 
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ($ million) 
Barley 1 4 84 42 71 15 43 
Beef and veal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corn 28 150 1,534 2,599 2,772 1,092 155 
Cottonseed 0 0 0 79 100 85 0 
Cotton 3 466 935 2,108 846 2,027 2,067 
Dairy 4,691 4,456 4,560 4,308 4,949 4,318 1 
Hogs/pork 0 0 123 74 0 0 0 
Honey 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 
Canola 0 0 8 39 78 27 27 
Flaxseed 0 0 2 12 24 12 14 
Mustard 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Rapeseed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Safflower 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 
Sunflower 0 0 21 142 145 60 61 
Mohair 0 0 0 0 6 10 0 
Oats 0 0 20 29 45 2 7 
Peanuts 299 306 340 323 331 320 267 
Rice 6 6 21 439 631 486 676 
Rye 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghum 1 2 63 156 85 5 30 
Soybeans 14 45 1,275 2,905 3,141 3,439 3,574 
Sugar 908 1,011 1,055 1,531 1,063 1,022 1,042 
Tobacco -21 -8 -7 322 335 125 -4 
Wheat 8 36 516 1,034 889 196 171 
Wool 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Apples 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Cranberries 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 
Lamb 0 0 0 20 10 0 0 
Non-commodity specific 1,115 568 4,584 6,990 6,912 6,445 2,175 
        
Total 7,052 7,043 15,134 23,155 22,481 19,818 10,305 
 
 
U.S. Farm Policy and the World Trade Organization: How Do They Match Up? / 17 
TABLE 6. Aggregate measures of support (after de minimis exemptions) 
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ($ million) 
Barley 0 0 84 42 71 0 43 
Beef and veal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corn 0 0 1,534 2,599 2,772 1,092 0 
Cottonseed 0 0 0 79 100 85 0 
Cotton 0 466 935 2,108 846 2,027 2,067 
Dairy 4,691 4,456 4,560 4,308 4,949 4,318 0 
Hogs/pork 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Honey 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 
Canola 0 0 8 39 78 27 27 
Flaxseed 0 0 2 12 24 12 14 
Mustard 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Rapeseed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Safflower 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sunflower 0 0 0 142 145 60 61 
Mohair 0 0 0 0 6 10 0 
Oats 0 0 20 29 45 0 0 
Peanuts 299 306 340 323 331 320 267 
Rice 0 0 0 439 631 486 676 
Rye 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghum 0 0 63 156 85 0 0 
Soybeans 0 0 1,275 2,905 3,141 3,439 3,574 
Sugar 908 1,011 1,055 1,531 1,063 1,022 1,042 
Tobacco 0 0 0 322 335 125 0 
Wheat 0 0 516 1,034 889 0 0 
Wool 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Apples 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Cranberries 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 
Lamb 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 
Non-commodity specific 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Total 5,898 6,238 10,392 16,089 15,546 13,154 7,771 
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TABLE 7. Aggregate measures of support and total fixed decoupled payments 
 Current  Senate Ag. Comm. Cochran- 
 Farm Bill House 2002 2004 Roberts 
 ($ million) 
Fixed payments 4,008 5,242 8,425 4,233 8,069 
      
Before de minimis      
Commodity  
 specific 
8,130 11,758 15,791 15,791 11,758 
Non-commodity 
 specific 
2,175 8,132 2,175 5,069 2,975 
Total 10,305 19,890 17,966 20,860 14,733 
      
After de minimis      
Commodity  spe-
cific 
7,771 11,138 15,791 15,791 11,138 
Non-commodity 
 specific 
0 0 0 0 0 
Total 7,771 11,138 15,791 15,791 11,138 
 
the U.S. amber box spending and possibly to the U.S. AMS (barring de minimis 
exemptions). Therefore, the probability that the United States will exceed its WTO  
domestic support limit would increase under these proposals. Our analysis shows that 
amber box spending that counts against the AMS limit is higher under all of the proposals 
when compared to the current farm bill. However, all of the proposals keep spending below 
the AMS limit, given projected price and production levels. The House and Cochran-
Roberts proposals are projected to have $11 billion in expenditures that count against the 
limit. The Senate agricultural committee proposal is projected to spend $16 billion. 
But just concentrating on projected expenditures after de minimis ignores part of the 
story. The various proposals also affect the United States’ standing under the URAA by 
the categorization of the additional payments. The current farm bill is projected to have 
$14 billion in combined spending on fixed payments and amber box spending (before de 
minimis). All of the proposals spend at least $22 billion. The House bill increases fixed 
payments by $1.2 billion, commodity-specific support by $3.6 billion, and non-
commodity-specific support by $5.9 billion. All of the increase in commodity-specific 
spending comes from the dairy support program. The increase in non-commodity-specific 
support is due to the new countercyclical program in the House proposal. We classify this 
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as non-commodity specific because producers receive these payments whether they grow 
the payment crop or not. The Cochran-Roberts bill increases fixed payments by 
$4 billion, commodity-specific support by $3.6 billion, and non-commodity-specific 
support by $0.8 billion. The dairy program accounts for the commodity-specific increase, 
while government matching funds for the farm savings accounts make up the non-
commodity-specific support increase. Thus, while the House and Cochran-Roberts 
proposals are projected to have the same amount count against the AMS limit, the 
Cochran-Roberts bill directs most of its increase in spending to green box payments 
(which are exempt from WTO limits) and the House bill concentrates payments in the 
non-commodity-specific amber box. This means that the House proposal has a higher 
probability of exceeding the WTO limit. If an additional $2 billion is spent on non-
commodity-specific support (either through higher crop insurance indemnities or 
countercyclical payments) under the House proposal, then the entire amount of non-
commodity-specific support would count against the limit and the United States would 
exceed the limit. 
 With the 2002 policy structure under the Senate agricultural committee proposal, fixed 
payments increase by $4.4 billion, and commodity-specific support increases by $7.6 
billion. With the 2004 policy structure under the Senate agricultural committee proposal, 
fixed payments increase by $0.2 billion, commodity-specific support increases by $7.6 
billion, and non-commodity-specific support increases by $2.9 billion. The commodity-
specific-support increase is due to the dairy program and the increases in marketing loan 
rates. The 2002 policy structure does not have any increase in non-commodity-specific 
support, but the 2004 policy structure does. This is because the new countercyclical 
program in the Senate proposal is in effect not under the 2002 structure but under the 2004 
structure; fixed payments are lowered and the countercyclical program is projected to have 
expenditures. Thus, the Senate agricultural committee proposal trades green box support 
for non-commodity-specific amber box support as time progresses. 
 
Concluding Comments 
At the WTO ministerial meetings in Doha, Qatar, member countries agreed to an 
agenda for agriculture that would work toward elimination of trade-distorting subsidies. 
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This goal is consistent with the proposal made by the United States in 2000 for an 
extension to the URAA that would simplify the policy classifications to exempt and non-
exempt policies. AMS levels would again be reduced, with the final level being 
determined by a fixed percentage of the country’s total value of agricultural production in 
a fixed-base period. The percentage would be the same for all participating countries. 
Exemption requirements would be rewritten to emphasize the limitation of trade-
distorting practices. Criteria for the exemption of programs essential to food security and 
development in developing countries would be added. 
The reasoning behind this proposal is that it is both in our national and global interest 
to expand agricultural trade. By removing trade-distorting domestic support policies, 
countries are allowing agricultural producers to base production decisions on market and 
environmental signals. This will expand economic opportunity for the agricultural sector, 
while addressing food security and environmental concerns. Consumers also will benefit 
through more competitive prices and a wider array of products. 
This official stance of U.S. negotiators clearly is not shared by U.S. domestic 
concerns, as they propose to significantly expand U.S. support for agriculture. Much of 
the proposed support would count against the WTO commitments made by the United 
States. Of the three proposals, the Cochran-Roberts bill has the lowest likelihood of 
exceeding the AMS limit. The House and Senate agricultural committee proposals have 
higher likelihoods. This is due to additional non-commodity-specific support under the 
House proposal and additional commodity-specific support under the Senate agricultural 
committee proposal. 
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